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iNTrOduCTiON
Since the dramatic revelations of Iran’s illicit nuclear activities in 2002, 
commentators have speculated that Turkey will follow suit and seek to 
acquire nuclear-weapon capabilities to balance Iran and meet the potential 
challenges of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. Academics and 
pundits have scrutinized Turkey’s interest in nuclear energy projects with a 
view to “discovering the real motives” behind its past and current initiatives. 
What is the likelihood of Turkey “going nuclear” in the years ahead despite 
its outstanding performance under the nuclear nonproliferation regime?
A number of factors are believed to have kept Turkey from seeking to 
produce its own nuclear-weapon capabilities. A discussion about Turkey’s 
domestic interests and characteristics as well as international factors, such 
as its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its adherence 
to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and its European Union (EU) 
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vocation, will be followed by scenarios about possible courses of action that 
Turkish policymakers might adopt in case they decided to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Needless to say, this will be a speculative, intellectual exercise, 
which will be carried out with a view to addressing a number of issues that 
are most frequently raised inside and outside of Turkey, such as who would 
be in charge of a Turkish nuclear-weapon development project, what would 
be the strategy for evading Turkey’s commitments under the nuclear non-
proliferation regime, which capabilities and technologies would be acquired 
and/or indigenously developed for becoming self-sufficient in the long 
term, who would be the international partners, and the like. 
ThEOriES Of NuClEar PrOlifEraTiON  
aNd ThE CaSE Of TurkEy
Nine countries in the world are acknowledged as possessing nuclear weap-
ons. Seven of them—the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, 
China, India, and Pakistan—have proven their capabilities by carrying 
out nuclear tests. North Korea, meanwhile, also carried out tests, but its 
weaponization capacity is not known for sure. There is also Israel, which 
has neither acknowledged nor denied the existence of nuclear weapons in 
its arsenal. 
Considering that approximately 200 states exist in the world, the 
number of states that are believed to possess nuclear weapons constitutes 
indeed a small fraction, less than 5 percent. The number of states, however, 
could have been much higher, perhaps in the dozens. Preventing a signifi-
cant number of states from pursuing nuclear weapons would have been 
very difficult, if not impossible, had there been no international efforts that 
culminated in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT).1 The incentives as well as assurances that were given to states to 
join the NPT and to forgo the option of developing nuclear weapons in 
return for ample support in advancing peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy were found to be satisfactory by many states that might have other-
wise pursued nuclear weapons.2 Still, some states are suspected of acquiring 
scientific and technological capabilities that are necessary for developing 
nuclear weapons. This raises an essential question as to why states would 
want nuclear weapons.
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The dynamics of nuclear proliferation have been explored by many aca-
demics.3 In this sense, the curiosity about the motivation that leads coun-
tries to pursue nuclear-weapon programs is well researched.4 First and 
foremost, it was found that countries attempt to do so for security reasons, 
to seek the capability to deter military threats. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz 
argued that military leaders dislike uncertainty and so claim that they 
need nuclear power to guard against an uncertain future. Many of the 
academics focus on external factors such as perceived threats. They main-
tain that it is a rational response for countries to protect their own interests 
for state survival. Classical realists, such as Zachary S. Davis and Richard 
K. Betts, contend that states pursue nuclear-weapon programs if doing so 
contributes to their own national security, but they accept that domestic 
politics also play a role in states’ decisions. Thereby, they agree that there 
are different types of states that react differently to external factors. 
Classical realists, unlike neorealists, posit that states have multiple, 
interlinked goals and that these objectives have both domestic and inter-
national aspects. Domestic concerns may vary from political stability to 
social cohesion, or economic strength to technological developments. 
Politicians try not only to survive in the international arena but also to stay 
in power as long as possible. Thus, they may attempt to use nuclear-weapon 
programs as a tool to stay in power by winning public support and enhanc-
ing their domestic political position. Governments facing oppositional 
challenges might use the nuclear card to divert public criticism. In this 
sense, nuclear weapons can be utilized as an instrument to mobilize a 
nation’s patriotism.5
Additionally, states may decide to acquire nuclear weapons in a quest 
for regional and/or global hegemony. According to the realist assumption, 
states try to maximize power and therefore undertake such programs 
because of their desire to achieve regional preponderance. The realist camp 
argues that these states may even attempt to blackmail other states into 
submission to their political wishes as a nuclear power. They may want to 
acquire nuclear weapons to gain prestige and also in order to join the club 
of “untouchables,” and they believe that their nation can attain complete 
independence only by becoming a nuclear-weapon state.6
Moreover, states may do so in order to strengthen their economies, to 
try to get “more bang for the buck.”7 In other words, they compare 
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conventional weapons in terms of the security output per dollar. It is here 
that the belief comes into play that states possessing nuclear weapons 
invest less on conventional weapons. However, Harald Müller and other 
scholars argue that nuclear-weapon states still invest in conventional weap-
ons and that acquiring nuclear arms is not necessarily accompanied by 
decreasing investments in conventional arms.8 
Furthermore, the bureaucracy, namely the military and scientific estab-
lishments, may push the governments in power to embark on nuclear- 
weapon programs. Persuading decisionmakers to pursue such a policy may 
get more resources for the bureaucracy, which also seeks to enhance its 
position vis-à-vis other national institutions. 
Finally, the high-tech environment attributable to advances in science 
and technology enables such programs to be carried through. When the 
know-how is present, it is easier for bureaucratic institutions to persuade 
the government to go nuclear.
Against this background, which only briefly explains how and why states 
are motivated to pursue nuclear weapons, one may argue that these factors 
have been, in varying degrees, present in the case of Turkey as well. For 
instance, Turkish security elites have always claimed that Turkey is situated 
in a very dangerous neighborhood, being at the epicenter of the Balkans, 
the Caucasus, and the Middle East. That’s how they justified maintaining a 
large standing army, ranking second among the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) countries after the United States, in order to be able 
to cope with threats perceived from all directions. As a result, the defense 
budget in Turkey has constituted a significant proportion of government 
spending for decades.9 Under these circumstances, Turkish decisionmakers 
could have justified developing nuclear weapons as both a deterrent to ene-
mies and a way of diminishing military expenditures. 
Since the mid-1980s, starting with the government of President Turgut 
Özal, Turkish politicians have had the ambition to elevate Turkey to the 
position of a regional power and a global player in world politics. From 
that perspective, the prestige that would be gained from nuclear-weapon 
capability would have made them more confident in their pursuit of asser-
tive foreign and security policies to achieve their objective. 
Moreover, the scientific and scholarly community as well as the civilian 
and military bureaucracy in Turkey have been generally receptive to the 
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idea of acquiring “nuclear power,” even if “nuclear weapons” may not have 
been explicitly pronounced in that context. Many scholars and experts as 
well as bureaucrats and politicians in Turkey have promoted plans for 
developing a scientifically and technologically advanced nuclear infra-
structure and a complete nuclear fuel cycle apart from installing nuclear 
power reactors for energy generation.10 
ThE faCTOrS ThaT kEPT TurkEy frOM gOiNg NuClEar
The foregoing brief profile suggests that Turkish political and security 
elites could have found justification for pursuing a nuclear weapon capa-
bility. However, they did not do this for a number of reasons. Turkey’s 
international considerations, such as its membership in NATO, its adher-
ence to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and its EU vocation would 
have made it difficult for Turkish decisionmakers to pursue nuclear weap-
ons even if they had wished to do so. 
Turkey has long pursued a policy of subscribing to the relevant inter-
national arms control and disarmament treaties and conventions as well as 
contributing to their effective implementation. This practice helped raise a 
cadre of civil and military bureaucrats, scholars, scientists, experts, and 
intellectuals who have developed a stance against the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction. Diplomats, military officers, and bureaucrats 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the General Staff, and the like, 
who have been involved in international nonproliferation efforts in various 
platforms, have developed over the years a high degree of consciousness 
about the possible consequences of developing nuclear weapons clandes-
tinely. Therefore, since the 1970s, whenever plans for building nuclear 
power plants have come to the fore, the Turkish bureaucracy endured a 
certain degree of tension with respect to a number of critical decisions, 
such as what should be the type and/or the size of the nuclear reactors, 
which country should be the supplier, whether or not to invest in uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in the future, and the like. 
For instance, Turkey and Argentina signed an agreement in 1990 to 
form a joint architectural-engineering firm to develop Argentina’s modu-
lar low-power CAREM-25 reactors, one in each country.11 While Turkey 
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agreed to provide most of the financing for the work, Argentina would 
provide most of the technology.12 If preparations for the building of two 
units had gone ahead as planned, work on the first unit in Argentina 
would have begun in 1991, and the construction of the second unit, in 
Turkey, would have begun in 1992.13 The long-term goal of the joint ven-
ture was to export the reactor to other nations in Latin America, Africa, 
and the Middle East.14 
Turgut Özal who, as Turkish prime minister prior to becoming presi-
dent, had corresponded and met with Argentine President Carlos Menem 
regarding the project and thus played a key role in obtaining the agree-
ment. Despite the fact that high-level talks in the nuclear field had been 
carried out between Argentina and Turkey and had culminated in a formal 
document, the CAREM-25 project was canceled a year later by the unilat-
eral decision of Yalcin Sanalan, then director of the Turkish Atomic Energy 
Authority. Sanalan notes that he “found the prospects of the CAREM-25 
deal ambiguous” on the grounds that “CAREM-25 was too small for elec-
tricity generation and too big for research or training, however, very suit-
able for plutonium production” and thus a proliferation concern. Therefore, 
Sanalan “concluded that such an ambiguous project would decrease the 
chances of Turkey in its current and future quest for large-scale nuclear 
power plants which the country really needed.”15 This anecdote, shared 
with the author by Professor Sanalan, may provide insights into the inner 
circles of the decisionmaking mechanism in the Turkish state bureaucracy 
with respect to the differences of opinion on sensitive issues, such as 
nuclear energy projects, that are still relevant today.16 
A major impediment to the potential ambitions of Turkish decision-
makers to acquire nuclear-weapon capabilities has been the security assur-
ances given by NATO to Turkey since its entry into the alliance in 
February 1952. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 
1949, in Washington, D.C., constitutes the basis of the “positive security 
guarantees” given to Turkey by other members of NATO, that an attack 
on any member is an attack against all. Accordingly, Turkey’s entire terri-
tory has been covered by a nuclear umbrella that may effectively deter 
possible attacks from other countries. U.S. nuclear weapons that have been 
deployed in allied countries in Europe including Turkey have long been at 
the crux of the “extended deterrence” capability of the alliance.17 The 
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NATO-wide ballistic missile defense system, known as the “missile shield,” 
is another form of assurance provided to Turkey by the alliance against the 
threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
vehicles. This system is expected to become fully operational in 2018. The 
decision to install the essential parts of the missile shield (the radar site in 
Kürecik in the Malatya district in eastern Turkey) was finally made at the 
NATO summit meetings in Lisbon in November 2010. The radar site in 
Kürecik started to operate as a NATO asset concomitantly with the 
Chicago summit meeting of NATO in May 2012.18 
A second factor that limited Turkey’s options has been its treaty obliga-
tions under the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Turkey became a state 
party to the NPT by signing it on January 29, 1969, and subsequently rati-
fying it on April 17, 1980. Turkey also concluded a “full-scope” Safeguards 
Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1982, 
meaning that the agency monitors all nuclear facilities in Turkey. Eventually, 
Turkey joined the other international nuclear nonproliferation efforts such 
as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 
2000, and it signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty in 2001. Turkey also endorsed efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and the verification mechanism of the IAEA. 
Accordingly, in the 1990s, Turkey paid much attention to the proceed-
ings of a study called “Programme 93+2” as an attempt to make IAEA 
safeguards inspections more intrusive, which culminated in the Additional 
Protocol in 1998. Turkey signed the Additional Protocol on June 6, 2000, 
and it entered into force for Turkey on July 17, 2001.19 Turkey also co-
sponsored a joint working paper by a number of European allies and sub-
mitted it to the May 2010 NPT Review Conference. The paper stated that 
global nuclear disarmament requires an incremental but sustained 
approach in which all treaty-based nuclear arms control and disarmament 
agreements are indispensable for the active promotion of collective secu-
rity and cooperation in the pursuit of this objective.20 More recently, 
Turkey took part in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 
(NPDI), a cross-regional, ministerial-level group initiated by Australia and 
Japan that focuses on practical steps with a view to taking forward the 
consensus outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.21 
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A third factor that limited the options available to Turkish decision-
makers has been Turkey’s candidate status before the European Union. 
Turkey began a “Westernization” process as early as during the nineteenth-
century Ottoman Empire. The early modernization attempts in the 
Turkish Republic were undertaken during the 1920s with a view toward 
accelerating the country’s transformation into a Western-style, secular 
nation-state.22 Turkey’s interest in its relations with the West gained fur-
ther momentum with its admission to the Council of Europe in 1949 and 
to NATO in 1952. Then came the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which gave 
Turkey an attractive prospect to eventually become a full member of the 
European Union. Since 1987, when the first official application for 
member ship was made, Turkey has been a consistent candidate for EU 
accession. After long deliberations, the accession negotiations between 
Turkey and the EU started in 2005 but soon stagnated. If and when the 
accession process is successfully completed, as a condition of full member-
ship, Turkey would become a state party to the Euratom Treaty, which 
would permit only peaceful applications of nuclear technology. 
u.S. NuClEar WEaPONS iN EurOPE  
aNd ThE POSiTiON Of TurkEy
Among the key factors that kept Turkey from considering the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, the impact of NATO’s “extended deterrence” and the 
role of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on Turkish territory in this 
context deserve special attention. As of fall 2014, the state of affairs between 
Turkey and its Western allies is testing solidarity in a number of issue 
areas—including the remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in 
Europe, where Turkey and its allies may have contradicting policies. 
Reports indicate that 150–200 tactical nuclear weapons belonging to 
the United States are still deployed in five European members of NATO: 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.23 Turkey has 
hosted U.S. nuclear weapons since the intermediate-range Jupiter missiles 
were deployed in 1961 as a result of decisions made at NATO’s 1957 Paris 
summit. The Jupiter missiles were withdrawn in 1963 in the aftermath of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. After that, U.S. nuclear weapons under U.S. Air 
Force custody remained in air bases in Eskişehir, Malatya, Ankara, and 
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Balıkesir, where F-100, F-104, and F-4 Phantom aircraft belonging to the 
Turkish Air Force were planned to deliver them.24 With the end of the 
Cold War, most of the nuclear weapons were withdrawn from these bases. 
Today, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are still stored in Turkey, albeit in 
much smaller numbers and in only one location, the İncirlik base near 
Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.25 
Turkey has long relied on the strong deterrent capability of NATO’s 
nuclear strategy. Turkish officials would prefer to continue to benefit from 
the extended deterrence provided by these weapons stationed in Turkey. 
However, the positions of some European allies have not been fully com-
patible with that of Turkey. On February 26, 2010, the foreign ministers 
of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway wrote 
a letter to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary general at the time, 
indicating that they would “welcome the initiative taken by President 
Obama to strive toward substantial reductions in strategic armaments, 
and to move toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons and seek peace 
and security in a world without nuclear weapons.” The letter also empha-
sized that there should be discussions in NATO as to what the allies “can 
do to move closer to this overall political objective.”26 
In response, Turkish officials warned that such an attitude would seri-
ously damage “solidarity” and “burden sharing,” two fundamental princi-
ples of the alliance that have been the basis for Turkey’s agreeing to the 
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. Turkish officials, therefore, 
expected other allies also to continue hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on their 
soil, if only in symbolic numbers. In this way, Turkey would not stand out 
as the only NATO country in Europe that retains U.S. nuclear weapons.27
Notwithstanding the initiative of the five European allies, the Strategic 
Concept Document that was adopted during the Lisbon summit in 
November 2010 underlined that NATO would remain a nuclear alliance 
as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world.28 Moreover, in the Deterrence 
and Defense Posture Review issued at the Chicago summit in May 2012, 
the allies agreed that the North Atlantic Council would task the appropriate 
committees to develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible 
participation of allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements, 
including in case NATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on nuclear 
weapons based in Europe.29 
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Voices are still being heard in Europe suggesting that these weapons 
should be sent back to the United States despite the adopted document 
that emphasized the significance of the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear 
weapons on European territory. For instance, in advance of national (and 
European) elections in Belgium in May 2014, the Flemish socialists 
announced at a party congress that they would not enter a Belgian govern-
ment if U.S. tactical nuclear weapons remained on Belgian territory, let 
alone were modernized.30 
Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea probably will end the 
debate within NATO over withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons. However, 
if in the future the European allies decide to ask the United States to with-
draw its nuclear weapons from their territory, Turkey would be left with 
two options: to carry the burden of forward deployment of U.S. nuclear 
weapons within the alliance all by itself (or perhaps with Italy) and to 
reverse its long-standing policy of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons and send 
them back to the United States. Each option is worth analyzing. 
If the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from other 
European allies, Turkish authorities, despite their declaratory policy, could 
welcome the continuation of deployment of these weapons in Turkey as a 
credible deterrent to current and potential rivals in the region. It goes 
without saying that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the 
Middle East, in particular, constitutes one of the primary sources of 
threats to Turkey’s national security and stability. Turkish officials are not 
fully confident that the assurances given to Turkey by NATO would be 
credible enough without the actual presence of the United States in the 
picture. Therefore, they may prefer relying on the extended deterrence pro-
vided by the United States and its nuclear weapons, whose deployment on 
Turkish soil would be seen as a guarantee of U.S. involvement on Turkey’s 
side in any future contingencies.31 
If Turkey decided to join European allies should they opt to send back 
the U.S. nuclear weapons, Turkish-American relations could be negatively 
affected. Nearly a decade ago, when asked about the status of U.S. nuclear 
weapons, Turkish officials underlined that keeping the weapons had to do 
with the nature of Turkish-U.S. relations and Turkey’s place in the Western 
alliance. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons that remained in 
Turkey was believed to strengthen the bonds between the United States and 
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Turkey, which had suffered serious setbacks due to the unfulfilled expecta-
tions on each side during and after the crisis situation in Iraq starting in late 
2002.32 Turkish-American bonds were severely strained after Turkey’s rejec-
tion of the U.S. request to station troops on its soil in the run-up to the war 
in Iraq in March 2003.33 Turkish officials then feared that withdrawing 
U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey in the aftermath of such a delicate 
period would have further weakened the long-standing strategic alliance.34 
Hence, at a time when the two countries may need each other’s tangible 
support in protecting their national interests vis-à-vis the current conflict-
laden issues, such as Syria’s civil war, Iran’s controversial nuclear program, 
Iraq’s instability, and Ukraine’s ongoing crisis, sending U.S. nuclear weap-
ons back may not hold much appeal to Turkish officials.
lONg-TErM rEliaBiliTy Of ThE faCTOrS ThaT kEPT 
TurkEy frOM aCquiriNg NuClEar WEaPONS 
Notwithstanding the longstanding responsible state practice of Turkish 
governments, which joined every existing nuclear nonproliferation instru-
ment, concerns remain about whether the next generation of decision-
makers in Turkey would consider taking steps toward acquiring nuclear 
weapons. These concerns may be prompted, among other factors, by the 
stance of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government vis-à-vis 
regional and global issues that exhibit notable differences in style and sub-
stance from the policies of former governments. Especially over the past five 
years, Turkey has followed a much more assertive foreign policy with an 
ambition to become a more visible player on many regional and even global 
issues.35 Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former foreign minister who became prime 
minister in August 2014, considers this policy as a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for the realization of his government’s long-term objective 
“to make Turkey a global power.”36 Western security analysts are, therefore, 
concerned that Turkey’s state practice and the current state of affairs in its 
relations with the institutions mentioned above, which are seen as insur-
ance policies against its potential inclination toward acquiring nuclear 
capabilities, may not remain on the same track in the medium to long term.
With respect to the assurances provided by NATO, in the eyes of many 
Turks, the powerful image of the Alliance has been diluted in its 
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transformation from a collective defense organization with a “hard power” 
stance, to a collective security organization with a perceived “soft power” 
attitude. Likewise, under the influence of anti-American sentiment, which 
is pervasive in the Turkish public domain lately, NATO is starting to be seen 
as an organization that “serves primarily the interests of the United States 
and helping it to establish its world hegemony.”37 Traces of such an approach 
can be seen in the harsh criticisms leveled against the missile shield project 
of the alliance that required the deployment of a radar site in Turkey.38 
As for the European vocation, it is necessary to underline that even 
though the start of the accession talks has institutionally brought Turkey 
closer to the EU, the optimistic mood among Turks and Europeans soon 
took a negative turn. Suspicions of Turkey’s suitability for membership 
have grown ever since.39 Objections to Turkey’s membership on the basis 
of identity-related considerations have increased, while the arguments in 
favor of Turkish accession on the basis of cost-benefit calculations have 
weakened.40 With growing societal security concerns over the existence of 
millions of Muslims in Europe, the EU has become increasingly reluctant 
to develop a strong geopolitical commitment to Turkey’s eventual acces-
sion.41 Besides, the AKP government, which was commended in the West 
for being progressive as well as promoting the rule of law, improving 
human rights, normalizing troubled civil-military relations, boosting the 
economy, and taking genuine initiatives to solve Turkey’s long-standing 
conflicts with its neighbors, is now being harshly criticized in Europe. For 
instance, during a visit to Brussels on January 22, 2014, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, the prime minister at the time, was reminded by European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso that “respect for rule of law 
and independence of the judiciary [were] basic principles of democracy 
and essential conditions for EU membership.” Similarly, Herman Van 
Rompuy, president of the European Council, told Erdoğan that “it is 
important not to backtrack on achievements and to ensure that the judi-
ciary is able to function without discrimination or preference.”42 
Within the nuclear nonproliferation regime, meanwhile, a series of sig-
nificant international developments over the past decade have cast doubts 
on the future prospects of the regime. These developments include North 
Korea’s nuclear detonations; revelations about Iran’s secret facilities suitable 
for fissile material production; failure to persuade all states of concern, 
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including Iran, to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol; and failure to urge 
the enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hence, the 
possibility of the NPT’s becoming an ineffective treaty stands out as one 
particular reason that some in Turkey espouse the idea of having at least the 
basic infrastructure for nuclear-weapon capability.43 Under these circum-
stances, while Turkey, like other states, certainly could import nuclear 
power plants or seek over time to indigenously produce them without 
intending also to acquire nuclear-weapon capabilities, suspicions often arise 
that dual purposes lie beyond new nuclear power programs, especially those 
that might include uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
SCENariOS aBOuT TurkEy’S NuClEar fuTurE
So far, in this chapter, issues concerning Turkey’s official engagement with 
nuclear energy projects have been discussed, by and large, by relying on 
verifiable information, either collected by the author while conducting 
academic research on the subject over the past two decades, or on readily 
available open sources, such as academic books and journals as well as 
magazines and media pieces. Therefore, topics that are covered in this 
chapter until now have presented the author’s interpretation of various 
features of Turkey’s official stance toward the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Special attention has been paid to staying away from speculative 
comments with respect to the strategies that could have been adopted by 
Turkish governments. 
This section, however, will attempt to discuss a number of scenarios44 
concerning the possible courses of action that Turkish policymakers might 
consider adopting in case they decided to pursue nuclear weapons in 
response to a number of contingencies. Such contingencies include Iran 
manifesting its nuclear-weapon capability, which would embolden the 
clergy in their attitude toward Turkey; aggravation of the security situa-
tion in Iraq and Syria, with both holding Turkey responsible for such an 
outcome; worsening of relations with Russia due to its mounting pressure 
on Turkey to prevent the passage of American naval vessels through the 
Turkish Straits on the grounds of the provisions of the 1936 Montreux 
Convention;45 deterioration of relations with the European Union due to 
European leaders’ severe criticism of undemocratic practices of Turkish 
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governments; and waning of the U.S. commitment to the strategy of 
extended nuclear deterrence. This list of contingencies can be further 
extended, as the geopolitical and geostrategic environment in Turkey’s 
neighborhood is highly conducive to unwelcome developments, as most 
recently seen in Crimea. 
In the event of one or more of these contingencies taking place, the 
scenario exercised here would assume that the Turkish ruling elite might 
decide to develop a nuclear-weapon capability as a countermeasure against 
the threats posed to Turkey’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty 
in the medium to long term. Should this be the case, several critical ques-
tions would then emerge: Who would be in charge of the nuclear-weapon 
development project? What would be the strategy for evading Turkey’s 
commitments under the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Which capabili-
ties and technologies would have to be acquired and/or indigenously 
developed for becoming self-sufficient in the long term? Who could be the 
international partners? 
Answers to these and other hypothetical questions may be given only 
by the authorities of the institutions that would be involved in such a proj-
ect. Hence, the following paragraphs can only speculate about what the 
possible course of action might be.
Who Would be in Charge of the nuclear-Weapon 
Development project?
It would be safe to argue that any decision to pursue nuclear weapons would 
be made first by consensus at the highest echelons of the state mechanism. 
Then, the National Security Council meetings, chaired by the president and 
attended by the prime minister as well as a few key ministers, such as for-
eign and defense ministers and their top bureaucrats, would most likely be 
the exclusive venue for high-level deliberations on alternative strategies. 
These meetings would also be appropriate for inviting a limited number of 
scholars, scientists, and experts whose opinions would be expected to help 
the top executives to crystallize their decisions about whether to stay in the 
NPT while working on a weapons program; which technologies to acquire 
and/or develop indigenously; which country or countries to collaborate 
with in the international arena, and so on. Of course, inviting such people 
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might compromise secrecy. But the law forbids revealing information about 
meetings taking place at the National Security Council. 
By virtue of the role that it used to play until the democratization of 
civil-military relations in Turkey, the National Security Council also 
would act as an interim general secretariat, responsible for coordinating 
the agenda of the meetings and keeping their records, at least until the 
ultimate strategic decision would be made as to who would be in charge of 
the project. This last point would be crucial, and the answer would depend 
on who is president and/or prime minister at the time the project would be 
under consideration. Turkey is a parliamentary democracy, and despite 
being the “commander in chief” according to the Turkish constitution, 
the president was usually considered as de facto subordinated to that of the 
prime minister when it comes to critical executive decisions (an exception 
being if the president is a charismatic leader like the late Turgut Özal or 
the current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).46 According to the constitu-
tional amendments of 2010, Turkey’s president will henceforth be elected 
by popular vote, as was the case on August 10, 2014. This may change the 
power relationship between the president and the prime minister and may 
give an enhanced sense of policy initiative to new presidents. The prime 
ministry might then act only as the executive branch carrying out deci-
sions that would be supervised by the president. Alternatively, the prime 
minister could lead the project. Charisma gains currency in this equation 
because it would be crucial both to motivate the top bureaucracy to per-
form its best as well as to achieve harmony within the state mechanism 
where diverging views and opposition to the project would be likely.
Not everyone who would be involved in these deliberations would be 
like-minded and fully support the idea to develop nuclear weapons. 
Opposition would most certainly come, primarily from the career diplo-
mats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who would inform the top deci-
sionmakers about the possible serious consequences of Turkey’s violation 
of its treaty obligations under the NPT, not to mention the degree of 
damage that such a move might cause to political, economic, and military 
relations with the Western alliance in the first place.
The General Staff, meanwhile, would try not to project an image of 
being an adamant supporter of the nuclear-weapon program. This would be 
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done as a cautionary attitude, considering a possible backlash in due course 
in case the politicians reversed their decision, either under the constraints 
that they would face in the international arena, or due to a change in the 
government and/or political leadership who may want to cancel the project 
altogether. The General Staff also would be cautious about the sensitive 
nature of military relations with NATO in general and the United States in 
particular. Yet, the degree of opposition, if only sporadic, that could come 
from the top brass might not be decisive enough to change the course of 
actions if the country proceeded down the road toward nuclear weapons.
The National Intelligence Authority, even though it is represented in 
the National Security Council meetings at the undersecretariat level, 
recently has started to play a much more important role in the foreign and 
security domains, just as in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency of 
the United States and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) of the United 
Kingdom, due to the restructuring of its departments as well as its mission 
and its vision. The National Intelligence Authority would probably be at a 
standby position at all times with a view to establishing contacts for the 
procurement of the material and technology necessary for the advance-
ment of the project as well as to provide, among others, counterespionage 
service to protect the scientific and technical staff involved in the project.
In addition to these institutions that would constitute the backbone, or 
the “A-Team,” of the project, select ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources, and government institutions, such as the 
Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, would be the tip of the iceberg—offi-
cially responsible for the execution of the nuclear project in the open in 
accordance with Turkey’s treaty obligations, considering that Turkey 
would stay in the NPT at least until it was within three months of being 
able to produce a bomb, when it could give notice to withdraw.
What Would be the Strategies for acquiring  
necessary Capabilities?
For any country whose decisionmakers would consider developing an 
elaborate nuclear program that would enable them to divert peaceful 
applications to military applications in the future, two different strategies 
may be contemplated. The first would be to acquire the necessary techno-
logical infrastructure and scientific skills through legal transactions from 
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supplier countries by staying in the NPT and then to walk away from the 
treaty obligations after having acquired the advanced capabilities neces-
sary for a self-sufficient nuclear-weapon development program. The second 
would be to collaborate with one of the major nuclear-weapon-capable 
states, possibly one that would not be bound by NPT obligations and also 
willing to provide the technological infrastructure as well as the scientific 
skills necessary to build nuclear weapons clandestinely.
In the case of Turkey, policymakers might consider that a feasible 
option would be a combination of the two alternatives, which would mean 
to acquire, on the one hand, some necessary capabilities through legal 
transactions from the supplier states, as well as to acquire, on the other 
hand, scientific skills and technological parts that are necessary to build 
facilities for uranium enrichment and/or plutonium reprocessing, which 
would probably be denied to Turkey by its allies in the West. Recent devel-
opments taking place in the context of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) meetings only enhance this view. 
For instance, when the United States proposed limiting transfers of 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies from the members of the NSG 
to states that do not already possess this technology, the NSG drafted a 
“clean text” in 2008 that attempted to take into account all viewpoints 
and finally receive the support of all members. The clean text included 
both objective and subjective criteria. The objective criteria were manda-
tory conditions that suppliers would have to take into account before com-
pleting an enrichment and reprocessing transfer. The subjective criteria 
were additional criteria that suppliers could take into account, such as 
those proposed earlier by the United States regarding considerations of 
domestic and regional stability; prior agreement to refrain from acquiring 
enrichment and reprocessing capability; a coherent reason for desiring the 
technology; and whether a transfer would be used for peaceful purposes. 
In addition to the opposition voiced by Brazil and Argentina, Turkey 
opposed the subjective criteria of the clean text. In particular, Turkey took 
issue with whether a plausible reason exists for a transfer of sensitive 
nuclear technology to take place, and the impact of the transfer on the 
country and the region’s stability and security.47 Turkey felt that it would 
be viewed as being in an unstable region, and therefore it would be denied 
transfers regardless of its nonproliferation record and commitments.48 
144       TiTle   |  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Turkey’s position was that the NSG should not victimize any country 
simply because its neighbors are considered problematic.49 Turkey also 
opposed the “black-box” requirement for trade of sensitive technology,50 
which means that the transfer must take place under conditions that will 
not permit or enable replication of the technology.51 As outlined in a recent 
Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies report,52 although 
Turkey has invested in a number of technologies needed to form the basis 
of a civilian nuclear energy program, its lack of commercial scale enrich-
ment and reprocessing technologies make it unlikely that Turkey could 
quickly develop a nuclear weapon. The report also states that given the 
nascent state of its nuclear industry, as well as the difficulties involved with 
the development of commercial scale enrichment and reprocessing, Turkey 
would likely have to rely on foreign suppliers for fuel cycle technology.
Would turkey imagine putting Weapons on missiles?
Within the context of the scenario outlined here, there is also need for a 
discussion about whether Turkey would want to put weapons on missiles, 
and if so, which ones would be feasible.53 At present, Turkey’s missile capa-
bility is limited and consists of short-range rockets and missiles. Turkey 
had initially sought to partner with the United States for the co- development 
of a system similar to the U.S. Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), 
but the two sides could never reach an agreement on the terms of technol-
ogy transfer. Turkey purchased 72 MGM-140A ATACMS surface-to-sur-
face missile batteries from Lockheed Martin in 1996. The missile has a 300 
kilometer range and is outfitted with a Global Positioning System–aided 
inertial guidance system. With the assistance of technology transfer from 
Chinese companies, Turkey first produced the 100-km range T-300 Kasırga 
(Hurricane) artillery rocket. Turkey and China also cooperated on the 
development of Roketsan’s J series short-range ballistic missiles. The J-600 
T Yıldırım (Thunder) is based on China’s WS-1 unguided rocket system. 
The missile is reported to have a range of 150 kilometers with a warhead 
weighing 480 kilograms. It is reported that the Turkish Armed Forces have 
six batteries in operation.54 
Turkey is keen on taking a longer-term approach to its missile produc-
tion programs and aims to develop the capability to manufacture the mis-
siles locally. Therefore, Turkey is likely to continue in its efforts to secure 
MuSTafa kibaroĞlu       145
favorable technology transfer agreements from foreign suppliers, rather 
than simply opt to purchase a slew of missile systems without receiving 
any co-production or transferred technology in return. In December 2011, 
then prime minister Erdoğan reportedly called upon Turkey’s defense 
industry to develop the capability to produce long-range missiles. 
Comparing Turkey’s arsenal to Iran’s, Erdoğan noted that Iran has mis-
siles with a range of over 2,500 kilometers, while Turkey’s missiles are 
limited to 150 kilometers.55
The Turkish Armed Forces have reportedly begun working on the 
nation’s first project to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile. A deci-
sion to launch the project was made in a meeting of the Defense Industry 
Executive Committee, headed by Erdoğan and General Necdet Özel, chief 
of the General Staff. The committee decided to form a satellite launch 
center that would have a twofold effect on Turkey’s aerospace and military 
endeavors. First, the center will enable Turkey to place its own satellites in 
orbit, and second, the center will allow the Turkish military to launch mis-
siles that can navigate outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. Attaining an inter-
continental ballistic missile launch capability is reportedly the chief aim of 
the satellite launch center. The Turkish Defense Ministry, the Undersecretariat 
for Defense Industries, and the Scientific and Technological Research 
Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) have been jointly working on the project 
for some time. The report said Turkey could cooperate with an undisclosed 
Eastern European country to develop the satellite launch center.56
Who Could be the international partners?
In a scenario where Turkish decisionmakers are presumed to opt for a 
nuclear-weapon program, it is clear that Turkey would need international 
partners to advance its scientific and technological capabilities also in 
enrichment, reprocessing, weapons design, metallurgy, and other areas 
from the level where they are now to a level where developing nuclear 
weapons would be within its reach. In the scientific domain, Turkey had 
indeed a large number of nuclear engineers and technicians who earned 
their degrees in Turkey as well as abroad, from the 1970s onward when 
Turkey launched its first plans to build nuclear power reactors, none of 
which, mainly due to political problems, was ultimately realized.57 
Authorities argue that there are enough nuclear engineers and technicians, 
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though most of them are scattered around the world due to the lack of job 
opportunities in Turkey—enough, anyway, for running at least two 
nuclear reactors and the related facilities. Added to these, just as Iran did 
in its Bushehr power plant deal with Russia, Turkey started to send 
approximately 150 students to Russian institutions to pursue graduate 
degrees in the nuclear field. The figure is expected to reach 600, including 
undergraduate students. 
In addition to running the reactors, skilled personnel will be needed for 
doing design and construction of all the components for nuclear weapons. 
Yet, the formation of a cadre of scientists who would be responsible for the 
execution of the project may not be the biggest problem. Acquisition of 
sensitive technologies, such as uranium enrichment, would necessitate 
outside support, and the most likely candidate, as has been the case with 
Iran’s nuclear program, would be Pakistan. 
Before counting on any support that might come from Pakistan, it 
must be noted that Islamabad has apparently committed not to proliferate 
anymore, especially since the A. Q. Khan incident.58 Pakistani scientists 
and their connections are watched very closely in this domain. Yet, it must 
also be taken into consideration that Turkey and Pakistan have historically 
developed fairly strong relations. For almost any Turkish citizen, Pakistan 
used to be the one and only country truly friendly to Turkey. Revolutionary 
thoughts and the principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and 
the first president of the Republic of Turkey, inspired the Pakistani people 
in their fight for independence against the British. As an indication of the 
countries’ ties, Atatürk’s name has been bestowed on a variety of institutes, 
libraries, and the most beautiful districts in Pakistan’s big cities. Turkey’s 
historic relations with Pakistan gained momentum with the 1964 Regional 
Cooperation for Development agreement that brought together Turkey, 
Iran, and Pakistan. The warm relations were further intensified in many 
respects in the aftermath of the military coup in Turkey on September 12, 
1980. The military leaders of Turkey and Pakistan, President General 
Kenan Evren and President General Zia ul-Haq, respectively, paid a series 
of visits to each other’s country until the latter was killed in a plane crash 
on August 17, 1988. These ceremonial visits increased the magnitude of 
sympathy and of trade and cooperation in many fields, including the civil-
ian and military spheres, are fertile soil for rumors to grow. Hence, when 
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NATO blocked Pakistan’s enrichment program in the early 1980s, 
President Zia ul-Haq reportedly opened talks with Turkey, taking advan-
tage of his “brotherhood” with his Turkish counterpart Kenan Evren. At 
the same time, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou reportedly said 
that “Pakistan expected Turkey to act as a transshipper of material for a 
nuclear bomb and would reciprocate by proudly sharing the nuclear bomb 
technology with Turkey.”59 At present, both Pakistan and Turkey are dis-
turbed by the fact that Iran has advanced its nuclear capabilities and is 
increasingly closer to building nuclear weapons. This may well be a reason 
for Turkey to expect Pakistan, which has mastered its nuclear-weapon 
development capabilities, especially uranium enrichment technology, to 
satisfy its expectations for technology transfer in the nuclear field. 
Brazil could be another candidate with which Turkey could collaborate 
in the area of acquisition of sensitive technologies. The two countries 
joined forces in May 2010 to negotiate the “Tehran Declaration” that 
aimed at lending transparency to Iran’s controversial nuclear program. 
Brazil’s significance, from Turkey’s perspective, also stems from its history 
of seeking nuclear weapons in the 1970s, when it was entered in a stiff race 
with its neighbor and rival Argentina. As a result of the concomitant tran-
sition to democracies from dictatorships, the two countries have signed the 
Quadripartite Agreement with IAEA and joined the NPT, which freed 
them from their ambitions to build nuclear weapons.60 Yet Brazil main-
tains its powerful stance against the provisions of the Additional Protocol 
of the IAEA. Considering that Brazil is a member of the NPT and also the 
NSG, a collaboration between Turkey and Brazil could be similar to the 
one in which Russia supplies Iran with sensitive technologies within the 
context of the rights of non-nuclear-weapon states envisaged in Article IV 
of the NPT. The Brazilian Navy, which started a nuclear propulsion pro-
gram in the early 1980s, has developed enrichment technology using 
centri fuges. Even though most enrichment of the fuel fabricated in Brazil 
for its nuclear reactors is undertaken by Urenco in Europe or in the United 
States, enrichment at the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó (São Paolo 
state), which remains a naval facility, continues, and it is reported to be at 
a 5 percent U-235 level.61 So Brazil might provide a basis for Turkey to 
acquire enrichment technology that may be eventually developed indige-
nously by Turkish engineers and technicians.
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Japan may also be a candidate for supplying Turkey with sensitive tech-
nologies. In early 2014, there were conflicting reports about possible col-
laboration between Japan and Turkey in the area of uranium enrichment 
and plutonıum reprocessing. During Prime Minister Erdoğan’s meeting 
with his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe, a $22 billion deal was signed in 
Tokyo on the nuclear plant project, planned to be built in Inceburun on 
the Black Sea coast by a joint venture involving Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries. The Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun reported on January 8, 2014, 
that a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official claimed that “upon 
Turkey’s demand a clause, which allows Turkey to enrich uranium and 
extract plutonium, [was] added in the nuclear agreement signed by the two 
nations.”62 Soon after, however, Turkey ruled out the prospect of enriching 
uranium as part of its nuclear program. Officials said “the government of 
Prime Minister Erdoğan [would] not develop uranium enrichment capa-
bility” and that “Turkey did not reach agreement with Japan to produce 
nuclear fuel.” On the same matter, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz 
said that “Turkey [did] not have any project regarding nuclear fuel and 
uranium enrichment.” In a briefing on January 8, 2014, he acknowledged 
that “Turkey sought to learn to produce nuclear fuel for its four planned 
reactors.” But, he said, “Ankara’s interest [did] not extend to establishing a 
uranium enrichment sector.”63
CONCluSiON
Based on this scenario, which is presented as a speculative intellectual 
exercise, even if one considers for a moment that Turkey decided to develop 
nuclear weapons and also managed to get the support of a nuclear power, 
or that it successfully established a clandestine nuclear-weapon procure-
ment network, what would be the role of nuclear weapons in Turkey’s 
security and foreign policies? Would nuclear weapons enhance Turkey’s 
security? Or would they simply hurt Turkey’s interests?
Any attempt to illegally pursue, let alone acquire, a nuclear-weapon 
capability would be extremely damaging to Turkey’s vital interests. Turkey 
is passing through a difficult domestic and international political conjunc-
ture in which any number of sensitive issues (social, economic, political) 
may be carefully exploited by its rivals. Even if one considers for a moment 
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that Turkey managed to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability, under which 
scenarios and against whom would these weapons have added value in 
Turkey’s foreign and security policies? It is difficult to give a meaningful 
answer to this question. 
Of Turkey’s immediate neighbors, Iraq and Syria are both deeply 
immersed in internal conflicts, and the future of these regimes is bleak. 
Neither is likely to pose a threat that Turkey could not deal with by non-
nuclear means. As for Iran, even if its nuclear-weapon capability someday 
upsets the balanced relations with Turkey, that alone may not be justifica-
tion for Turkey’s countering with nuclear weaponry and going through all 
possible hardships to get there. And in any case, a nuclear-weapon-capable 
Iran would most likely be dealt with collectively by the rest of the interna-
tional community, the United States and Israel being at the forefront.64 
Greece and Armenia are other potential countries with which Turkey had, 
and may have, problems in its foreign relations. While Greece and Turkey 
have fought wars in the past and, therefore, Greece might be seen as a 
potential threat by Turkish security elite, there is no possibility that 
Armenia would ever present a military threat to Turkey. Moreover, the EU 
membership of Greece and the powerful Armenian diasporas in the 
United States and Europe would most likely nullify the nuisance capabil-
ity of Turkey’s nuclear power against these countries. In addition, Turkey 
has good neighborly relations with the rest of the countries in its environs, 
such as Bulgaria, Romania (both now NATO allies), Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Russia (which has a large nuclear arsenal). All told, it is difficult to 
conjure a dispute, either internally or in the international community, in 
which Turkey’s use of nuclear weapons would be justified.
There is, therefore, no feasible scenario under which Turkey could 
expect to effectively use its nuclear power status, if and when achieved. 
However, there are scenarios in which Turkey’s vital interests would be 
seriously damaged simply because it would have attempted to acquire a 
nuclear-weapon capability. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the “top-secret” meeting of Turkey’s for-
eign minister with top bureaucrats from the military, diplomatic, and 
intelligence branches of the Turkish state apparatus in his “secure office,” 
where they discussed alternative strategies to deal with the delicate secu-
rity situation in Syria, leaked to the press on March 27, 2014, keeping a 
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clandestine nuclear-weapon development project away from the watchful 
eyes of the international community may be next to impossible. 
Even though there is talk in Turkey about why Turkey should develop 
nuclear weapons, among those who approach the issue from the perspec-
tive of national pride and prestige as well as security, it is not clear whether 
they are aware of the possible serious consequences of such action, which 
would mean, among others, violation of Turkey’s international obliga-
tions. Secretly going down this path and being discovered could cost 
Turkey not only international prestige, but also quite possibly NATO 
guarantees, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
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